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Darwin and the Memory of the 
Human: Evolution, Savages, and 
South America by cannon Schmitt. 
cambridge: cambridge University 
Press, 2009. Pp. 260, 5 illustrations. 
$90.00 cloth.
Darwin and the Memory of the Hu-
man: Evolution, Savages, and South 
America is a beautifully written, el-
egantly conceived contribution to 
the study of nineteenth-century 
evolutionary theory’s cultural im-
plications. taking as its object four 
writers—the evolutionary think-
ers charles Darwin and alfred 
russell Wallace, the writer and 
clergyman charles Kingsley, and 
the early-twentieth-century bota-
nist and adventure novel writer 
W. H. Hudson—three of whom 
worked in biology and natural his-
tory, two of whom ventured into 
fiction, and all of whom wrote 
about or around South america, 
cannon Schmitt’s volume focuses 
on moments in these texts when 
savagery, South america, and 
memory converge. although the 
texts he examines all detail experi-
ences of South america (or in 
Kingsley’s case, not quite getting to 
South america), and all fall loosely 
under the category of natural his-
tory, what interests Schmitt are the 
moments when natural history be-
comes memoir, when writing about 
life as defined by evolutionary biol-
ogy intersects with what we call 
life-writing: autobiographical ac-
counts of significant personal expe-
riences. Personal memory of a 
personal past here intersects with 
communal historical and evolu-
tionary memories of the vast pasts 
of the planet, of life, of humanity, 
of england. this intersection be-
tween individual and collective 
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pasts allows Schmitt to argue that 
evolutionary theory necessitated 
the invention of a new human 
subject with a new relation to 
memory, “a form of memory that 
redefines what it is to be human 
(as well as modern, civilized, and 
British) in relation to the past, and 
specifically those pasts—historical, 
cultural, personal, and, above all, 
evolutionary—conceived of as sav-
age” (3). this form of memory, 
Schmitt calls “savage mnemonics.” 
and he sees it as part of the general 
modern crisis of memory described 
by richard terdiman in Present 
Past: Modernity and the Memory Cri-
sis, which Schmitt describes thus:
Modernity came into being as 
a self-consciously distinct his-
torical period by way of the 
distanciation of the present 
from the past as well as from 
its inability to recall or make 
sense of that past. Modernity, 
on this representation, resem-
bles an amnesiac who can re-
member only the necessity of 
recalling that which it might 
never have known or experi-
enced in the first place. (24)1
Whereas terdiman, like other 
contemporary memory theorists, 
tends to focus on poets, novelists, 
and other practitioners of the arts, 
Schmitt asks about the role scien-
tific ideas play in this crisis of 
memory.
In the first chapter, Schmitt’s 
focus is on the memory of Dar-
win’s encounter with the Fuegians 
in South america in 1832, a mem-
ory that reoccurs at key moments 
in his work from The Voyage of the 
Beagle (1839) to the Autobiography 
(1887, written in 1876). In the 
1830s, Darwin writes, “of individ-
ual objects, perhaps no one is more 
certain to create astonishment than 
the first sight in his native haunt of 
a real barbarian, of man in his low-
est and most savage state.”2 In the 
1870s, he writes again, “the sight 
of a naked savage in his native land 
is an event which can never be for-
gotten.”3 these words of Darwin’s, 
quoted and requoted by Schmitt, 
resonate and gather meaning as 
the chapter progresses. they reap-
pear, differently arranged, in other 
Darwin texts, as well—in particu-
lar the famous passage from the 
end of Descent of Man:
the astonishment I felt upon 
first seeing a party of Fuegians 
on a wild and broken shore 
will never be forgotten by 
me, for the reflection at once 
rushed into my mind—such 
were our ancestors. . . . He 
who has seen a savage in his 
native land will not feel much 
shame, if forced to acknowl-
edge that the blood of some 
more humble creature flows 
in his veins.4
Schmitt contrasts the unforgetta-
ble memory of the savage in his na-
tive land with forgetting of the 
death and destruction behind “the 
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face of nature bright with glad-
ness” that Darwin claims in Origin 
human beings are prone to.5 Peo-
ple forget or disavow death, but 
they cannot apparently forget the 
disturbing sight of the savage. 
critics have written about the sav-
age in Darwin before—focusing 
particularly on his appearance in 
Descent as the strange middle term 
in the continuity Darwin posits be-
tween the animal and the human. 
on the one hand, the savage is nec-
essary to positing the evolution of 
humans out of animals: he stands 
in the place of the missing link. on 
the other, the savage is also re-
markably the huge exception to 
that progression: unlike both ani-
mals and civilized people, and yet 
undoubtedly human, he is the bad 
example that incites readers to em-
brace their animal ancestry. In De-
scent to see oneself as descended 
from a monkey becomes palatable 
insofar as monkeys are more like 
civilized people than savages are. 
But what Schmitt adds to this dis-
cussion is a new sense of how the 
savage keeps open the gap between 
human and animal. In seeming to 
bridge that gap, savages in their 
exceptionality also maintain it: 
they stand outside the very conti-
nuity between human and animal 
that they make possible.
at a moment when other hu-
mans have been completely 
assimilated to the natural 
world, when the line between 
human and non-human has 
been revealed to be a con-
solatory fiction, Fuegians 
preserve human separate-
ness. . . . Darwin’s memory of 
“savages” on a wild and deso-
late shore should be under-
stood as, among other things, 
a memory of the last fully hu-
man being on earth. (56)
Whereas the memory of savages 
allows Darwin to posit a continuity 
between the animal and the hu-
man by constituting the savage as 
both link and exception, alfred 
russel Wallace’s “memories of 
South american and Southeast 
asian indigenes lead to the conclu-
sion that not they alone but rather 
humans as such constitute an ex-
ception” (86). Focusing on Wal-
lace’s descriptions of his first 
encounters with “the aborigines of 
the amazon,” encounters Wallace 
paradoxically sees as both the ful-
fillment of his expectations and as 
striking and new, Schmitt shows 
how, for Wallace, the exceptional 
nature of savages eventually ex-
tends to all human beings, exempt-
ing humanity from natural selection. 
Unlike Darwin, Wallace experi-
ences surprise and delight at his 
first encounter, admiring the bod-
ies, minds, and culture of a people 
uncontaminated by “european 
supervision.”6 Schmitt describes 
Wallace’s experiences this way:
So startling that they required 
he relearn to see, forgetting 
all he thought he knew about 
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them, savages were also so 
familiar as to confirm the ex-
istence of a world wholly dis-
tinct from that of “civilized” 
europe—a world whose en-
viable harmonious social ar-
rangements Wallace was, for 
a time, able to share. (81)
this admiration would lead 
Wallace to claim, in an 1868 review 
of lyell’s Principles of Geology, that 
savage brains and bodies exceed 
their survival needs and so could 
not have been produced by natural 
selection without some supernatu-
ral help. Because savage humanity 
can be remembered as so delight-
ful, so much in excess of necessity, 
so much less animalistic than cor-
rupt civilized modernity, it restores 
the very category of a humanity 
separate from the animal king-
dom. It also operates as a critique 
of the inhumanity of european 
civilization and conquest. If for 
Darwin the savage is paradoxically 
more debased than the animals 
from whom civilized man has 
sprung, for Wallace the savage is 
paradoxically more magnificently 
human than the degenerated prod-
ucts of civilization. thus, Schmitt 
claims, “[t]o remember the savage 
is also to remember what the hu-
man once was and thus what it 
might still become” (90).
 the Kingsley chapter is 
where the book intersects with the 
study of Victorian imperialism. It 
is centered on Kingsley’s travel 
narrative, At Last: A Christmas in 
the west indies (1871), which chiefly 
charts his travel on and around the 
island of trinidad. For Kingsley, 
the West Indies are a gateway to a 
South america he longs to visit but 
cannot. although his narrative is 
full of natural historical detail, the 
memory of the human that he en-
counters in his journeys is not the 
savage, but the ghosts of the 
“seadogs” of whom he wrote in his 
historical novel westward Ho! 
(1855), as well as the eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century naturalists 
who have journeyed before him. It 
is not the species past, but the na-
tional-imperial past, that figures 
largely in this chapter, a past that 
can be revived only in memory. 
Kingsley connects his own return 
to the West Indies of his childhood 
with a return in memory to the 
elizabethan childhood of empire, 
the age of exploration of the New 
World, making possible, Schmitt 
argues, “a reading of the ‘at last’ of 
his title as a personal expression of 
longing fulfilled that is, at the same 
time, a national-corporate expres-
sion of destiny accomplished” 
(108).
Kingsley’s framing of South 
america as a place to remember 
the elizabethan past, the moments 
of empire’s youth, as well as a place 
that may hold the perpetually de-
ferred imperial future, makes him 
very much the exception among 
the four figures Schmitt discusses. 
But it does give Schmitt a chance 
to touch upon the unique relation 
of South america to British impe-
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rialism: the way the collapsed 
empires of Spain and Portugal 
functioned both as negative images 
of tyranny against which the eng-
lish measured themselves and as 
admonitions about the fate of em-
pire. While not under British rule, 
South america was still subject to 
British economic imperialism. and 
in an era in which the story of em-
pire was rearticulated to center on 
the New World (see John r. See-
ley’s reframing in 1881 of the im-
portance of the New World in The 
Expansion of England), South amer-
ica stands out as the part of the 
New World the British didn’t ac-
quire, but to which they might 
now aspire.
the writer with whom Schmitt 
most clearly identifies, however, is 
not Kingsley, but W. H. Hudson, 
who is, in a way, the hero of this 
book, and whose beautiful and 
evocative descriptions of lost lands 
are often echoed by the cadences of 
Schmitt’s own prose. Born in South 
america (Buenos aires), and writ-
ing in london about the faraway 
land of his childhood, Hudson is 
obsessed with loss. loss comes not 
merely with the passage of time or 
with geographic distance, but also 
in the form of the destruction of 
the animal, plant, and human life 
of South america. Schmitt calls 
Hudson, after andreas Huyssen, a 
“memorian,” someone who recol-
lects the past through memory, and 
he argues that Hudson’s use of 
memory should resonate for us 
with twentieth-century memory 
studies, with their focus on trauma 
and destruction:7
this is the keynote of Hud-
son’s work: the solemn in-
vocation of a lost world as a 
form of testimony, protest, 
and lament. His memories 
of that world often provide 
glimpses of plenitude, realiz-
ing in imagination and on the 
page images of wild beauty. 
But they cannot do so without 
simultaneously insisting on 
past, present, and future ca-
tastrophe. this among other 
things distinguishes the struc-
ture of feeling in Hudson’s 
corpus from what might ap-
pear to be unmitigated or self-
indulgent nostalgia. (124)
Schmitt makes his argument 
through readings of three of Hud-
son’s major works: The naturalist 
in La Plata (1892), idle Days in Pa-
tagonia (1893), and A Hind in rich-
mond Park (1922). He argues that, 
for Hudson, the central dilemma 
of evolution is not the problem of 
man’s connection to his animal an-
cestors, but the other problem, the 
problem that Darwin says we for-
get when we behold “the face of 
nature bright with gladness”: the 
problem of destruction and extinc-
tion. When a species is gone, it is 
gone forever, never to be repeated. 
the only consolation for this loss is 
that evolution postulates a relation 
between what lives now and every-
thing that has ever lived: the lost 
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past lives on in every living organ-
ism. In particular, vanishing sav-
ages live on in present-day humans, 
which is on the one hand “trans-
parently self-serving, rendering 
the extermination of indigenous 
people’s bearable” and, on the 
other, enlists the savage past “in the 
service of the recollection of a pub-
lic, collective memory of wildness 
and savagery harnessed to political 
ends.” (127)
Ultimately, Schmitt argues, 
Hudson proposes a theory of mem-
ory and sense perception that is 
both Proustian and evolutionary: 
that is, Hudson understands hu-
man sense perception as both natu-
ral and historical, changing over 
time. latent in modern humans 
are the more intense senses of sight, 
smell, sound, and direction en-
joyed by their savage ancestors:
changes in the human sen-
sorium as well as changes in 
the world to be sensed, Hud-
son maintains, always amount 
to loss. Species are passing 
away into oblivion, and with 
them sights, sounds, scents; 
at the same time and partly 
as a result, human perceptual 
capacities, already much re-
duced in relation to what they 
once were, face continued 
atrophy. the intimate inter-
dependence of human per-
ception and that which exists 
to be perceived means that to 
destroy the latter is, inevitably, 
to diminish the former. By the 
same token, however, such 
interdependence also holds 
out the promise of a return 
to the lost past. the sound of 
Beethoven’s music, the scent 
of an evening primrose, the 
landscape of Patagonia: all 
take one back. By way of the 
memories they evoke they ef-
fect a return, and a return not 
to any distant time but specifi-
cally to that of human prehis-
tory. (150)
By making his readers remember 
their savage past, Hudson reminds 
them that “to destroy wilderness is 
to destroy themselves” (151).
the Hudson chapter is full 
of references to modernism—to 
Proust on the one hand, and to 
modernist primitivism on the 
other, a primitivism made possible 
by various biological and psycho-
logical theories about the inner 
savage. Schmitt acknowledges the 
complicity of primitivism with im-
perialism, but also wants to argue 
for a Hudson who is not merely 
nostalgic, but actively engaged in 
an ecological political project that 
makes vanishing beauty live for its 
readers as a way of encouraging 
them to take action to preserve the 
living things, including people, 
that civilization destroys.
In a brief (seven page) coda, 
Schmitt sketches out some of the 
implications of his argument link-
ing it to twentieth-century mem-
ory studies that center on trauma 
and to contemporary animal stud-
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ies. For Darwin, Wallace, Kingsley 
and Hudson, evolutionary theory 
is “both the discovery of and the 
response to disaster” (157)—so their 
work can be profitably compared, 
as Schmitt does, to W. g. Sebald’s 
Austerlitz (2001). these Victorian 
writers can also be compared to 
“thinkers as diverse as giorgio 
agamben, Donna Harraway, and 
cary Wolfe” (162), who, Schmitt 
argues, pose the question of the 
animal in ways that focus on the 
animal as human or the human as 
animal and forget what for the 
Victorians comes between:
of Darwin, and of Wallace, 
Kingsley, and Hudson, we 
might say instead that they 
depict people as though they 
were the animals haunted by 
the loss of what they imag-
ine comes between them and 
other animals—“savages”—
and as though the only way 
to free themselves from such 
haunting were to remember 
that that loss makes them who 
they are. (162)
Darwin and the Memory of the 
Human is part of a movement in 
cultural criticism about Victorian 
colonialism and imperialism to 
shift the focus away from indicting 
the Victorians and towards an un-
derstanding of how this experience 
restructured england and english 
people on every level. recent work 
by John Plotz, James Buzard, and 
christopher Herbert has looked 
beyond the “find the tyranny” 
model for other ways of thinking 
about culture and imperialism. 
Plotz’s Portable Property: Victorian 
Culture on the Move (2009) de-
tached the circulation of objects 
from the critique of global com-
modity culture in order to talk 
about the different kinds of mean-
ings objects accrue. In Buzard’s 
Disorienting Fiction: The Autoeth-
nographic work of nineteenth- 
Century British novels (2005), the 
ethnographic gaze that describes, 
categorizes, and objectifies the 
non-european is supplanted by the 
autoethnographic gaze that novels 
turn on their own culture. chris 
Herbert’s war of no Pity: The in-
dian Mutiny and Victorian Trauma 
(2007) is interested less in how rep-
resentations of the Indian Mutiny 
fomented racist hysteria in Britain 
in support of tyranny than he is in 
how the mutiny prompted a dissi-
dent, critical, antipatriotic kind of 
writing highly critical of British 
actions in India. Similarly, rather 
than charting the ways in which 
evolutionary science’s ideas about 
the savage acted in support of im-
perialist expansion, Schmitt here 
looks at a different side of knowl-
edge production and the impact of 
that production on the producer. 
on the one hand, this kind of work 
provides an important supplement 
to our existing accounts of empire 
in the Victorian period. all of these 
scholars are highly critical of impe-
rialism, and the turn in their own 
work to the impact of imperialism 
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on the British is not meant in the 
least to deny its horrors. yet, on the 
other hand, there is and ought to 
be something disturbing about the 
reimagination of empire as a mode 
of self-development for British 
people. read unsympathetically, 
not as a supplement to the critique 
of the dynamics of domination but 
as substitute for it, this work can 
seem as though it’s suggesting that 
world conquest makes you a better 
person.
Schmitt addresses this difficulty 
in two ways in the book. He pro-
vides constant reminders of the vi-
olence of imperialism—even in 
relation to South america, where 
British imperialism was primarily 
financial rather than a matter of 
direct rule. But his other way of 
addressing the problem is through 
the formal structure of the book it-
self, which operates as a kind of 
self-critique. the Kingsley chapter 
is the center of this critique. Unlike 
Darwin, Wallace, and Hudson, 
Kingsley never reaches South 
america. Savages therefore do not 
occupy the same place in his imagi-
nary: for Kingsley, the human ob-
ject of memory is historical rather 
than natural historical. Kingsley, 
in other words, sees savages as ut-
terly distinct from his modern civi-
lized self, and he doesn’t see them 
very often. So, in many ways this 
chapter is an anomaly in Schmitt’s 
book, a disruption in the general 
argumentative pull, a pause be-
tween Wallace and Hudson when 
the book moves away from savages 
and history and into the problems 
of empire itself. and yet it is also 
the essential chapter of the book, 
for in his memory of england’s 
historical past, of the explorers 
whose narratives he has read, 
Kingsley turns out to be most like 
Schmitt himself. like Kingsley re-
membering the savage elizabe-
thans, Schmitt remembers the 
savage Victorians, who, like King-
sley’s elizabethan sea dogs, con-
stitute a past that must be 
remembered, is always slipping 
away, and is, strangely, memorial-
ized. this is why Kingsley is both 
anomalous and also central to this 
book. He is the writer most in-
volved in furthering the project of 
imperialism, and the vanished past 
he remembers is not a savage past, 
but an imperial one. He is abso-
lutely necessary to Schmitt’s cri-
tique of imperialism, but like 
Darwin’s savage, he is also a figure 
of great ambivalence. Without 
him, there wouldn’t be sufficient 
reminder that empire isn’t pretty. 
But with him comes the problem-
atic of which savage ancestors 
Schmitt wishes to claim and which 
to deny. He would like to be Hud-
son, calling up precious lost savage 
Victorians in ways that restore 
valuable absent things to a world 
that needs them. But there is al-
ways the danger that, because after 
all Victorians are a lot more like 
elizabethan sea dogs than innocent 
savages, he might be calling up lost 
empire in a less productive mode 
he himself would call nostalgia.
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What I am doing here, in read-
ing an argument that Schmitt’s 
book makes through its form 
rather than through its content, 
points to what is truly astonishing 
and unique about this book, and 
what makes it radically different 
from any other scholarly work I 
know. It gives new meaning to the 
term “literary criticism” by mak-
ing its literariness part of its critical 
method. the incantatory beauty of 
Schmitt’s prose is not an incidental 
feature, a decorative belle-lettrism. 
rather it is designed to rerepresent 
the lost savage Victorians, to make 
them alive in us again, as we read 
Schmitt who, like Hudson, calls 
forth the ways of dwelling in the 
lost past that makes such continu-
ing presence possible. What King-
sley and Schmitt have in common 
is a past memorialized in words; 
what Hudson and Schmitt have in 
common is the production in 
words of an affective relation to a 
past that you do not even know 
you have missed until you read 
them. and those words act by pro-
ducing affect. this is what makes 
this book literary criticism and not 
conventional cultural studies or 
history of science. Schmitt’s book is 
about the intersection of ideas and 
affect in the works of all four men, 
and it embodies and enacts that in-
tersection in the very texture of its 
language. Scientists (and human-
ists) have feelings about thoughts, 
as well as thoughts about feeling—
and, in a way, this book works to 
re-create or create affect in the 
reader about these ideas. evidence 
here is not just the textual evidence 
of scholarly literary criticism, but 
also the successful production in 
the reader of affect that is also 
knowledge. Kingsley points up the 
dangers of this enterprise; Hudson 
its possibilities.
a recent special issue of repre-
sentations on “the Way We read 
Now” poses the question of the 
fate of symptomatic reading and 
speculates about what other read-
ing practices are taking its place—
surface reading, the archive, 
cognitive theory, media studies.8 
What for me holds all these modes 
together is a longing for the solid-
ity of the visible, the actual, the 
material: taking refuge in the ac-
tual words of the text, the vast 
number of texts in the archive, 
thinking as an activity of an em-
bodied brain, the physical medium 
of the book or newspaper. the 
immateriality of interpretation, 
thought, and critique seems to ren-
der these modes of thought dan-
gerously flighty, ungrounded, and 
insubstantial in a twenty-first cen-
tury in which everything is medi-
ated. Historicism can recover for 
us a world of actualities, and de-
scription is a central mode of criti-
cal access to that world. Schmitt’s 
descriptive prose, his sympathetic 
readings of these texts that seek not 
to expose their unconscious moti-
vations but to reveal the fullness of 
their accomplishment, are part of 
this. But Schmitt’s answer to the 
problem of immateriality is, like 
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that of his subjects, what we might 
call “memoricist” rather than his-
toricist. Not the materiality of 
Victorian things, but the strange 
persistence of Victorian words and 
their affective charge in the bodies 
of modern readers, is at issue. So 
alongside the scholarly argument 
of this book about memory and 
evolution runs another mode of 
conveying ideas entirely, one that 
uses literary techniques to produce 
in the reader the very structures of 
memory and emotion that it claims 
in its argument are characteristic 
of modernity. the memory of the 
memory of the human.
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